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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Our federalist system of government accords respect 
for the sovereignty of the States in a variety of ways, 
including the Eleventh Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which immunizes States from suits brought in 
federal court by both their own citizens and citizens of other 
States.  The Eleventh Amendment’s protection, however, is 
not limited to the States alone, but rather extends to entities 
 3 
that function as “arms of the State.”  In this case, we are 
asked to resolve a split among the district courts in our Circuit 
as to whether Montclair State University (“MSU”) is an arm 
of the State of New Jersey, which would render it immune 
from the discrimination suit brought by Appellee Paula 
Maliandi.  Applying the balancing test we have developed to 
make such determinations, we conclude that, while a close 
case, MSU is an arm of the State, thus affording it access to 
the refuge of the Eleventh Amendment.  Accordingly, we will 
reverse the decision of the District Court and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. Background 
According to her complaint, Paula Maliandi began 
working for MSU in November 2007 and took medical leave 
for breast cancer treatment in early 2013.  Despite having 
complied with all pertinent policies and procedures for taking 
such leave, Maliandi allegedly was denied her original 
position when she returned and instead was offered an 
inferior position, which she declined.  She was subsequently 
terminated.  Maliandi then filed suit against MSU for 
wrongful termination, seeking money damages and equitable 
relief under both federal and state law.  Maliandi’s federal 
claim arises under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) 
for termination on account of a “serious [health] condition.”  
While she does not cite a specific provision in her complaint, 
it would appear her claim is rooted in the so-called “self-care 
provision,” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), and its corresponding 
retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a).  Together, these 
provisions entitle a qualifying employee to twelve weeks of 
leave for a “serious health condition” and require an employer 
to restore an employee who took leave under § 2612 to her 
prior position or an equivalent one upon her return.  
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Maliandi’s state law claim arises under the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-1 
to -49, which, among other things, prohibits discrimination on 
account of a disability or handicap.   
MSU moved to dismiss Maliandi’s complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction based on its contention that, as an arm of 
the State, it is owed Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit 
in federal court.1  The District Court denied the motion, 
determining that MSU is not the State’s alter ego and, in turn, 
concluding that MSU is subject to suit in federal court for 
both the federal and state law claims.2  MSU appeals. 
                                              
 1 In both the District Court and on appeal, MSU has 
been represented by the Attorney General of the State of New 
Jersey. 
 
 2 Because neither party raises an argument on appeal 
as to whether Congress has, pursuant to its authority under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, abrogated 
Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims brought under the 
FMLA, we do not address that question today.  Assuming 
Maliandi is seeking to state a claim under § 2612(a)(1)(D) of 
the FMLA, however, such an argument would be unavailing.  
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1334-
38 (2012) (plurality opinion) (concluding § 2612(a)(1)(D) 
does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); id. at 
1338-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (same); see also 
Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding 
that “29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), and the related retaliation 
section, see id. § 2614(a)(1)” do not abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity).   
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 to adjudicate Maliandi’s FMLA claim and under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367 to consider her associated state law claim.  The 
District Court’s order denying MSU’s 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds is 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, 
imbuing us with jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Cooper 
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 548 F.3d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 
506 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1993)).  We consider whether MSU is 
owed Eleventh Amendment immunity de novo; as “the party 
asserting immunity,” MSU “bears the burden of production 
                                                                                                     
 Similarly, because the issues were not raised before us, 
we do not address whether New Jersey has waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court 
with regard to Maliandi’s NJLAD claim or the consequences 
for the District Court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction 
on remand.  See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 
391-93 (1998) (implying that a federal court can retain 
jurisdiction over state law claims after federal claims are 
dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds); Rudolph v. 
Adamar of N.J., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 528, 540-44 (D.N.J. 
2001) (discussing differing applicability of the Eleventh 
Amendment to NJLAD claims brought in federal court 
against New Jersey in its capacity as an employer compared 
to those brought against the State in its legislative or 
executive capacity); see also Heine v. Comm’r of Dep’t of 
Cmty. Affairs, C.A. No. 2:11-5347, 2014 WL 4199203, at *5 
(D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2014) (not published) (discussing district 
court decisions regarding New Jersey’s immunity from suit in 
federal court for NJLAD claims). 
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and persuasion.”  Febres v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 445 F.3d 
227, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2006). 
II. Discussion 
 Our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has wound its 
way through a number of variations—both subtle and 
significant—over the past decades.  To distill the principles 
that govern our analysis today, we first review the 
constitutional underpinnings and precedent relevant to the 
arm of the State inquiry, and we then apply those principles to 
determine whether MSU qualifies as an arm of the State 
entitled to immunity. 
A. History and Precedent 
The Eleventh Amendment began as a simple rebuke of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
419 (1793), that would have subjected States to suits in 
federal court and saddled them with the weight of the 
burgeoning republic’s Revolutionary War debts.  Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890); see also Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994).  More 
than two centuries later, however, it has evolved into a potent 
tool for States to ensure that States retain their sovereignty 
and integrity as constituent polities of our national 
government.  Hess, 513 U.S. at 39-40.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the Amendment does not merely 
shield state treasuries.  Instead, it advances two fundamental 
goals: safeguarding States’ dignity and protecting their 
financial solvency.  Id. at 52.   And although, by its terms, the 
Eleventh Amendment only withholds from the federal 
judiciary the power to decide cases brought against a State by 
a citizen of another State or a foreign government, U.S. 
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Const. amend. XI, the Court has interpreted it to bar suits 
against a State by its own citizens—not just those from other 
jurisdictions.  Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-15; see also Seminole 
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).   
Importantly for this case, the Court also has read the 
Amendment to bar not only suits against States themselves, 
but also suits for damages against “arms of the State”—
entities that, by their very nature, are so intertwined with the 
State that any suit against them renders the State the “real, 
substantial party in interest.”  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
651, 663 (1974) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)); see also Mt. Healthy 
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 
(1977) (using the term “arm of the State”); Febres, 445 F.3d 
at 229.   
 Because the Eleventh Amendment provides the States 
with sweeping immunity from suit, we have been careful to 
ensure that its reach does not extend beyond proper bounds.  
Accordingly, we employ a fact-intensive, three-step balancing 
test to ascertain whether a state-affiliated entity is an “arm of 
the State” that falls within the ambit of the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Our initial recitation of the test came in Urbano 
v. Board of Managers, 415 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 948 (1970), where we identified nine 
factors to consider.  Two decades later in Fitchik v. New 
Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (en banc), we attempted to consolidate those 
Urbano factors into a more manageable three-factor test that 
still governs today.   
 As explained in more detail below, the Fitchik factors 
are (1) the funding factor: whether the state treasury is legally 
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responsible for an adverse judgment entered against the 
alleged arm of the State; (2) the status under state law factor: 
whether the entity is treated as an arm of the State under state 
case law and statutes; and (3) the autonomy factor: whether, 
based largely on the structure of its internal governance, the 
entity retains significant autonomy from state control.  Id.  
Because, for the most part, we did not disagree with the 
Urbano factors,3 but rather organized them under the 
headings of Fitchik’s three factors, the layers of factors, 
subfactors, and considerations that inform those subfactors 
can still make an analysis seem dense, if not impenetrable.  
Moreover, each step of that analysis is a “fact-intensive” 
undertaking that requires a fresh analysis and “individualized 
                                              
 3 Although Urbano identified as a factor whether an 
entity performed a governmental or proprietary function, this 
factor was jettisoned in Fitchik in light of intervening 
Supreme Court precedent.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659 n.2 
(citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528, 546-47 (1985)).  While the Supreme Court has since 
made reference to a “function” inquiry for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes, see Hess, 513 U.S. at 44-45 
(comparing the function of the entity at issue with that of an 
entity from a pre-Garcia case and concluding the function 
was not “readily classified as typically state or 
unquestionably local”), and other Circuits still employ one in 
the Eleventh Amendment context, e.g., Ernst v. Rising, 427 
F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005); Fresenius Med. Care 
Cardiovascular Res., Inc. v. P.R. & Caribbean 
Cardiovascular Ctr. Corp., 322 F.3d 56, 65 & n.7 (1st Cir. 
2003), we are bound by our Court’s Eleventh Amendment 
test that now eschews this inquiry, Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659 
n.2. 
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determinations” for each entity claiming Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  See Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 546 (3d Cir. 2007). 
After identifying the direction in which each factor 
points, we balance them to determine whether an entity 
amounts to an arm of the State.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 664; see 
also Cooper, 548 F.3d at 311.  While our jurisprudence had 
long afforded the first factor—state funding—more weight 
than the others, see Fitchik, 655 F.2d at 664, we recalibrated 
the factors in light of the Supreme Court’s observation in 
Regents of the University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 
431 (1997), that an Eleventh Amendment inquiry should not 
be a “formalistic question of ultimate financial liability.”  We 
now treat all three Fitchik factors as co-equals, Benn v. First 
Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005), 
with the funding factor breaking the tie in a close case, see 
Febres, 445 F.3d at 229-30 (citing Hess, 513 U.S. at 47-48, 
52).   
We have had many occasions to apply the Fitchik 
(and, earlier, Urbano) factors, ruling on the Eleventh 
Amendment status of entities ranging from school boards to 
public transit authorities to state-affiliated institutions of 
higher learning.  Of particular relevance to this case are our 
decisions concerning the Pennsylvania State College System, 
Rutgers University, and the University of Iowa.  In 1976, we 
ruled en banc that Pennsylvania’s Bloomsburg State College 
was an arm of the State, Skehan v. Bd. of Trs. of Bloomsburg 
State Coll., 538 F.2d 53, 62 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Skehan I), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976), though our opinion there 
never mentioned, much less applied, Urbano.  We later 
concluded, under the Urbano rubric, that the Eleventh 
Amendment also shields Pennsylvania’s State System of 
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Higher Education.  Skehan v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 815 
F.2d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 1987) (Skehan II).  That same year, we 
concluded in Kovats v. Rutgers, The State University, 822 
F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1987), that Rutgers—a New Jersey public 
university that was initially chartered as a private 
institution—was not an arm of the State under our Urbano 
framework.  Then in 2007, we considered the status of the 
University of Iowa in Bowers and determined that, under 
Fitchik, it was an arm of the State on account of two of the 
three factors supporting immunity.  See Bowers, 475 F.3d at 
549. 
These cases provide guidance as we consider MSU 
and are “helpful in terms of analytic models,” but they 
ultimately do not “govern our decision as to [MSU] because 
‘each state university exists in a unique governmental context, 
and each must be considered on the basis of its own peculiar 
circumstances’”—including the specific statutes at play and 
the practical reality of the institution’s autonomy.  Kovats, 
822 F.2d at 1312 (quoting Soni v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Tenn., 513 F.2d 347, 352 (6th Cir. 1975)).4 
                                              
 4 Indeed, all three of our past cases addressing 
institutions of higher learning are distinguishable in their own 
right.  Skehan I, which predates our modern Fitchik test, was 
based on the laws of Pennsylvania rather than New Jersey, 
and relied almost exclusively on a state court case that 
characterized the college as an arm of the State, Skehan I, 538 
F.2d at 62 (calling state court jurisprudence “dispositive of 
the sovereign immunity issue”)—a myopic analysis that is out 
of step with our multi-factor test and that we have since held 
en banc should not be read to obviate the need to undertake a 
full Fitchik analysis, Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 
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The case law from our Sister Circuits is also 
illuminating.  As MSU points out, they have almost uniformly 
concluded that state-affiliated universities are arms of their 
respective States.  See, e.g., Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 
807 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. docketed, No. 15-1419 
(May 23, 2016); Irizarry-Mora v. Univ. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9 
(1st Cir. 2011); Md. Stadium Auth. v. Ellerbe Becket Inc., 407 
F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases for proposition 
that state universities are “[a]lmost universally” found to be 
arms of the State); Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 
F.3d 569, 575 (10th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases for the 
proposition that the Tenth Circuit has “consistently found 
state universities are arms of the state”); Kashani v. Purdue 
Univ., 813 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
846 (1987) (“The vast majority of cases considering the issue 
have found state universities to be forfended by the Eleventh 
Amendment.”); id. (“[While] [t]here are district court 
                                                                                                     
F.2d 807, 815 n.8 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc) (stating that it 
would be an “error” to read Skehan I to mean that “state law 
characterization is the only relevant consideration in 
determining if an agency is entitled to raise the Eleventh 
Amendment defense”).  While Kovats dealt with a New 
Jersey institution, Rutgers is distinguishable from MSU both 
because of its unique origins as a private institution and the 
fact that it is governed by a different set of state laws.  See 
822 F.2d at 1310-12; compare N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:64-1 to 
-93 (laws governing state colleges like MSU), with id. 
§§ 18A:65-1 to -102 (Rutgers provisions).  And Bowers 
similarly dealt with a different State’s university system, 
which established the University of Iowa in the state 
constitution—a trait not shared with New Jersey state 
colleges like MSU.  475 F.3d at 548. 
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opinions to the contrary[,] . . . it would be an usual state 
university that would not receive immunity.”); Hall v. Med. 
Coll. of Ohio at Toledo, 742 F.2d 299, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113 (1985) (collecting cases for the 
proposition that “[t]he great majority of cases addressing the 
question of Eleventh Amendment immunity for public 
colleges and universities have found such institutions to be 
arms of their respective state governments and thus immune 
from suit”).   
As we proceed with our own analysis, we are mindful 
of the near unanimity among the Courts of Appeals that the 
factors relevant to an Eleventh Amendment inquiry typically 
favor immunity in the state college setting.  However, 
because the particulars of our Fitchik test differ from 
analogous tests in other Circuits and because each entity 
seeking immunity warrants an individualized analysis, these 
cases do not dictate the answer to the question of first 
impression with which we are presented today. 
That question has bedeviled district judges in our 
Circuit, who are divided in their application of the Fitchik test 
to MSU.  Compare Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., C.A. 
No. 14-01398 (SRC), 2014 WL 3778259 (D.N.J. July 31, 
2014) (not published) (concluding MSU is not an arm of the 
State), and Ventura v. Montclair State Univ., C.A. No. 08-
5792 (SRC), 2011 WL 550720 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2011) (not 
published) (same), with Sarmiento v. Montclair State Univ., 
C.A. No. 04-cv-4176, letter op. (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2005) 
(concluding MSU is an arm of the State).5  We now resolve 
                                              
5 It is not just MSU sowing dissention among the 
district courts.  Courts applying our Urbano and Fitchik 
rubrics to other New Jersey state colleges also have reached 
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this dispute by concluding that MSU is an arm of the State, 
and in the process, we seek to synthesize our jurisprudence 
regarding the Fitchik factors for the benefit of district courts 
in future Eleventh Amendment cases. 
B. Fitchik Analysis for MSU 
 After undertaking our own analysis of MSU’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we cannot agree with the 
District Court’s determination that all three Fitchik factors 
counsel against immunity.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we conclude that the funding factor counsels against 
immunity, but that the status under state law and autonomy 
factors—while close—tilt in favor of extending MSU 
immunity from suit.  On balance, because two of the three co-
                                                                                                     
inconsistent conclusions, in part because of the evolving 
nature of our case law and in part because the issue presents 
“a very close question,” N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. 
Glouchester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 651, 655 
(D.N.J. 1995).  Compare Bostanci v. N.J. City Univ., C.A. 
No. 08-4339 (SRC), 2010 WL 4961621 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2010) 
(not published) (denying immunity to New Jersey City 
University), and N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 923 F. Supp. at 
665 (same to Glassboro State College and Trenton State 
College), with Nannay v. Rowan Coll., 101 F. Supp. 2d 272 
(D.N.J. 2000) (granting immunity to Rowan College), and 
Rehberg v. Glassboro State Coll., 745 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990) (same to Glassboro State College).  We note that 
Glassboro State College was later named Rowan College, and 
then renamed Rowan University.  Thus, a number of these 
cases rehashed the Eleventh Amendment immunity question 
for the same institution. 
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equal factors support MSU’s claim for immunity, we hold 
that MSU is an arm of the State that enjoys the protections 
afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. 
1. The Funding Factor 
 The funding factor, also called the “state-treasury 
criterion,” Febres, 445 F.3d at 232 & n.4, hinges on 
“[w]hether the money that would pay [a] judgment [against 
the entity] would come from the state,” Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 
659.  We consider three subfactors: (1) a State’s legal 
obligation to pay a money judgment entered against the 
alleged arm of the State; (2) alternative sources of funding 
(i.e., monies not appropriated by the State) from which the 
entity could pay such judgments; and (3) specific statutory 
provisions that immunize the State from liability for money 
judgments.  Id.; see also Cooper, 548 F.3d at 302-06. 
i. The State’s Legal Obligation to Pay 
Money Judgments 
 The Supreme Court has made clear in the years since 
Fitchik that we must focus our Eleventh Amendment inquiry 
not on a mechanical analysis of whether a State will 
ultimately pay a judgment, but rather “the crux of the state-
treasury criterion [is] whether the state treasury is legally 
responsible for the payment of a judgment against the 
[alleged arm of the State].”  Febres, 445 F.3d at 233; id. at 
236 (“The absence of any legal obligation on the part of New 
Jersey to provide funds in response to an adverse 
judgment . . . is a compelling indicator that the state-treasury 
criterion . . . weighs against immunity.”); accord Bowers, 475 
F.3d at 546-47 (citing Doe, 519 U.S. at 431).  Specifically, 
the Supreme Court has characterized the operative question as 
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“whether a money judgment against a state instrumentality or 
official would be enforceable against the State,” Doe, 519 
U.S. at 430, meaning that if a State only voluntarily 
indemnifies an entity, the funding factor is unlikely to tip in 
favor of immunity, despite the practical reality that the State 
foots the bill for a money judgment, Bowers, 475 F.3d at 
547.6 
 Rather than identify a legally enforceable obligation on 
the part of the State to pay money judgments entered against 
it, MSU relies largely on the argument that such money 
judgments would indirectly affect the state treasury because 
“the University financial statements are included in the 
State’s annual financial accounting.”  Appellant’s Br. 27-28.  
MSU’s primary argument thus appears to be that this 
reporting requirement would cause New Jersey to increase 
appropriations to cover losses that result from money 
judgments entered against the university.  Maliandi, 2014 WL 
3778259, at *2.  
 We have consistently rejected the argument that a 
State’s voluntary choice to pay a state-affiliated entity’s 
liabilities—even if that choice might be a foregone 
conclusion because of the State’s desire to keep the entity 
afloat—favors Eleventh Amendment immunity.  E.g., 
Bowers, 475 F.3d at 547; Febres, 445 F.3d at 236; Bolden v. 
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 819 (3d Cir. 1991) (en 
                                              
6 Conversely, the fact that a State is legally obligated 
to pay may be enough to satisfy this factor even if another 
entity—e.g., the federal government—will later indemnify the 
State, causing the outlay by the State to have no actual impact 
on the state treasury.  Doe, 519 U.S. at 431. 
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banc); Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 661; Kovats, 822 F.2d at 1309.  
Instead, in conformance with Doe, we have made clear that 
“practical or indirect financial effects of a judgment may 
enter a court’s calculus, but rarely have significant bearing on 
a determination of an entity’s status as an arm of the state”; 
rather, “[a] state’s legal liability (or lack thereof) for an 
entity’s debts merits far greater weight, and is therefore the 
key factor in our assessment of” the funding factor.7  Febres, 
445 F.3d at 236.  MSU’s indirect effects argument is 
therefore unavailing. 
MSU does not argue that judgments against it would 
have a direct effect on the state treasury—and with good 
reason.  We have identified only two exceptions to the rule 
that New Jersey law imposes no all-encompassing legal 
obligation on the part of the State to pay judgments entered 
against MSU.  First, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:3B-6(h) allows 
state colleges to elect to have the Attorney General represent 
them in suits brought under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act 
                                              
7 We have recognized two instances in which the 
“practical effect” of a judgment is tantamount to a legal 
obligation such that the entity may be entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  Cooper, 548 F.3d at 305 (discussing, 
but not applying, such scenarios); Febres, 445 F.3d at 235 n.9 
(citing Hess, 513 U.S. at 50) (same).  Both exceptions involve 
instances where Congress has put a proverbial “gun to the 
head” of the State to sustain the entity even without a legal 
obligation.  See Alaska Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Alaska R.R. 
Corp., 5 F.3d 378 (9th Cir. 1993); Morris v. Wash. Metro 
Area Transit Auth., 781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  Neither 
pertains to MSU. 
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(the “Tort Claims Act”), id. §§ 59:1-1 to :12-3, in which case 
the State is obligated to indemnify a college (or its 
employees) for any resulting judgment.  See also id. 
§§ 59:10-1 to -10.8  Second, the New Jersey Contractual 
Liability Act (the “Contractual Liability Act”), id. §§ 59:13-1 
to -10, expressly waives the State’s sovereign immunity for 
breach of contract claims arising from contracts entered into 
by “State” entities, id. §§ 59:13-2, -3. 
 Even assuming that New Jersey would have the legal 
obligation to pay judgments against MSU under the Tort 
Claims Act and the Contractual Liability Act, however, the 
exceptions embodied in those statutes only prove the rule, 
confirming the absence of an overarching legal obligation on 
the part of the State.  Absent such obligation, this subfactor 
counsels against treating MSU as an arm of the State.  
Bowers, 475 F.3d at 546-47; Febres, 455 F.3d at 236. 
ii. Alternative Sources of Funding 
 The second subfactor under the funding inquiry—
“whether the agency has the money to satisfy the judgment 
                                              
 8 Conversely, if a college opts not to use the Attorney 
General to represent and indemnify it in tort actions, the 
college may retain counsel of its choosing and has the legal 
obligation to pay money judgments entered against it, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:3B-6(h), counseling against immunity under 
the funding factor.  A college’s ability to decide whether to 
impose a legal obligation on the State for tort claims 
obviously also bears on the other two Fitchik factors: status 
under state law and autonomy.  See infra Parts II.B.2 & 
II.B.3. 
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[itself],” Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659, 6629—is more 
straightforward: we look to see if the entity has sources of 
funding aside from state appropriations and whether those 
funds could cover an adverse judgment.  This necessarily 
involves a review of the percentage of funds a given entity 
receives from the State, but there is no hard-and-fast rule 
about how much funding from the State is enough to trigger 
immunity, and, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Doe, the question of legal liability (i.e., subfactor one, see 
supra Part II.B.1.i) remains paramount.  See Cooper, 548 
F.3d at 303; accord Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 660 (“[T]he fact that 
an entity derives some of its income from the state does not 
mean that it is entitled to partake of the state’s 
immunity. . . . What is significant is whether the money that 
pays the fine will come from the state treasury rather than the 
agency’s funds . . . .”).  Beyond budgetary percentages, we 
also consider under this subfactor the extent to which the 
State retains ownership over the funds it appropriates 
and whether the entity is insured against money judgments.  
Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 660-62. 
 When reviewing the percentage of an entity’s funds 
that come from non-state sources, we have regularly 
determined that alternative sources of funding—even where 
only a small part of the entity’s overall budget—counsel 
against immunity.  For example, we have concluded that an 
entity has the capacity to pay money judgments out of its own 
funds even where the State appropriates 85-90% of the 
entity’s operating budget.  Febres, 445 F.3d at 232-34 (noting 
                                              
 9 “[A]gency” here—and elsewhere in our case law—is 
used to describe an entity that has argued it is owed Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. 
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that even where the State was the “principal source” of the 
entity’s revenue, legal liability is the most important 
consideration post-Doe); accord Cooper, 548 F.3d at 303-06 
(35-52% of the entity’s funds coming from the State); 
Bowers, 475 F.3d at 547 (21% of funds from the State); 
Bolden, 953 F.2d at 818-19 (27% of funds from the State); 
Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 660-62 (less than 33% of funds from the 
State); Kovats, 822 F.2d at 1308-09 (50-70% of funds in the 
general operating account from the State).  In many of these 
cases, we noted that the entity in question had the power to 
raise revenue itself, such as via fare increases for public 
transportation entities, or to dip into investments it had made 
in order to pay money judgments.  See Cooper, 548 F.3d at 
303-06; Christy v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 54 F.3d 1140, 1146 & 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1995); Bolden, 953 F.2d at 818-19; Fitchik, 873 
F.2d at 661. 
 MSU directs us to its own 2013 and 2014 financial 
statements to show that it is “fiscally dependent” on the State, 
Appellant’s Br. 26-28.  These reports indicate that, in the 
years 2012-2014, only 18.8-21.8% of MSU’s annual revenues 
came from state appropriations.10  Meanwhile, MSU derives 
                                              
 10 See O’Connor Davies, LLP, Montclair State 
University (A Component Unit of the State of New Jersey): 
Basic Financial Statements and Management’s Discussion 
and Analysis, June 30, 2014 and 2013 (“2013-2014 MSU 
Financial Statements”) 9-10 (2014), available at 
http://www.montclair.edu/media/montclairedu/financetreasur
er/controller/2014-MSU-Audit.pdf (last visited June 13, 
2016); O’Connor Davies, LLP, Montclair State University (A 
Component Unit of The State of New Jersey): Basic Financial 
Statements and Management’s Discussion and Analysis and 
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49.2-50.8% percent of its revenues from sources over which it 
has considerable control: e.g., tuition, fees, and room and 
board,11 see N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:64-6(n), (o), -13, -18, and 
is permitted to invest funds and retain the earnings on such 
investments, creating another source of funding separate from 
the state coffers, id. § 18A:64-18.2. 
 In addition to the mere existence of alternative sources 
of funding, we consider the degree to which funds 
appropriated by the State are owned by the State after being 
deposited into the entity’s bank account.12  Fitchik, 873 F.2d 
                                                                                                     
Schedules of Expenditures of Federal and State of New Jersey 
Awards, June 30, 2013 and 2012 (“2012-2013 MSU 
Financial Statements”) 8-9, available at 
http://www.montclair.edu/media/montclairedu/financetreasur
er/controller/FY13-A-133-(Awards).pdf (last visited June 13, 
2016).  Although these documents were not part of the record 
before the District Court, we may take judicial notice of them 
because they are “public documents,” N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18A:3B-6(l); see also id. § 18A:3B-51, and because 
Maliandi does not object to their consideration.  See Oran v. 
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 289 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2) and allowing, where the appellee 
does not object, an appellate court to take notice of the 
appellant’s properly authenticated public documents that were 
required by law to be filed). 
 
 11 2013-2014 MSU Financial Statements 8-10; 2012-
2013 MSU Financial Statements 8-9. 
 
 12 While Fitchik considered the State’s retention of 
ownership over appropriate funds in the second subfactor 
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at 661-62 (“[C]ontrol is . . . significant to the funding factor if 
it indicates ownership.”); see also Christy, 54 F.3d at 1145-46 
(noting that a State lacks financial interest in the diminution 
of funds it no longer controls).  Indeed, “[t]he magnitude of 
the state’s contribution” is of little relevance if “once 
deposited . . . the[] funds belong to the [entity]” because if 
state-appropriated funds are “used to pay a judgment, we can 
say only that the judgment was satisfied with the [entity’s] 
monies.”  Febres, 445 F.3d at 234; see also Kovats, 822 F.2d 
at 1308-09 (noting that state contributions to Rutgers’s budget 
were comingled with the University’s tuition and other 
revenues into a discretionary pot of money over which 
Rutgers retained sole control).   
 Here, although MSU must abide by the “minimal” 
constraint that it spend its funds within the general parameters 
of the State’s overall budget appropriations, Kovats, 822 F.2d 
at 1311 (discussing Rutgers’s ability to spend freely in the 
context of autonomy), it otherwise may spend state-
appropriated funds as it sees fit, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-
6(e), (f).  Further, leftover state funds are retained by MSU 
rather than returned to New Jersey’s treasury.  Id. § 18A:64-
18.1(b).  Thus, it cannot be said that the State retains 
ownership over the funds once they have been allocated to 
MSU. 
                                                                                                     
under the funding inquiry, 873 F.2d at 660-62, as we do here, 
later cases have considered it under the first subfactor, legal 
liability, discussed in Part II.B.1.i, Christy, 54 F.3d at 1146.  
Regardless, ownership is relevant to the funding factor and, in 
addition, it bears on the third Fitchik factor: autonomy.  See 
infra Part II.B.3. 
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 Another point we routinely consider in connection 
with alternative funding is whether a state-affiliated agency 
has the authority to purchase liability insurance to prevent 
shortfalls that could arise in the wake of large money 
judgments, so that the State is inoculated from any effect on 
its treasury.  Bolden, 952 F.2d at 819; Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 
661.  That sheds little light here, however, as New Jersey 
authorizes state colleges to obtain liability insurance for tort, 
contract, and workers’ compensation claims brought against 
them, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-87, but does not authorize 
insurance across the board, cf. id. § 27:25-5(r) (authorizing 
the New Jersey Transit Corporation at issue in Fitchik to 
obtain “any type of insurance and indemnify against loss or 
damage to property from any cause”).   
 On balance, MSU’s alternative sources of funding also 
tip against immunity. 
iii. Statutory Immunity from Liability 
 The third subfactor stands for the simple proposition 
that where the State has expressly immunized itself from the 
entity’s liabilities, it thereby indicates the entity is not an arm 
of the State and hence not entitled to protection under the 
Eleventh Amendment.13  Here, New Jersey has immunized 
itself from the liability of its state colleges in two 
                                              
 13 We have been far from vigilant about separating this 
subfactor from the first, with some of our cases combining the 
consideration of statutory immunity with the legal liability 
inquiry discussed in Part II.B.1.i.  E.g., Cooper, 548 F.3d at 
304.  Here, we consider it separately in line with Fitchik’s 
recitation of the three subfactors.  873 F.2d at 659. 
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circumstances: (1) for loans taken out by a state college upon 
which the college later defaults, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-6(t), 
i.e., an exception to the State’s assumption of liability for 
contractual debts under the Contractual Liability Act; and (2) 
for a state college’s violation of the requirements of the State 
College Contracts Law,14 id. § 18A:64-6(k), an immunity of 
little significance to our analysis given that this law also 
immunizes the state colleges themselves, id. § 18A:64-81.   
Those isolated instances stand in stark contrast to the 
sweeping statutory immunity “from liability on judgments 
entered against Rutgers” that we said counseled against 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in Kovats.  822 F.2d at 1310-
11 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:65-8); accord Cooper, 548 
F.3d at 304; Bolden, 953 F.2d at 819; Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 
661.15 
                                              
 14 The State College Contracts Law imposes 
requirements and limitations on state colleges’ contractual 
authority, such as mandating that a college engage in 
competitive bidding for projects exceeding $26,200.  See, 
e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-55.   
 
 15 We reject the argument that the State’s statutory 
immunity from liability in these two areas gives rise to a 
negative inference that the State is liable for judgments 
against MSU in all others.  Particularly in the absence of any 
affirmative indication that the State has general responsibility 
for judgments against MSU, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:3B-
6(h), we will not infer from two narrow statutory 
provisions—one of which is an exception to an express 
waiver of the State’s immunity and the other of which simply 
makes clear that the statute does not serve as a waiver of 
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*    *    * 
 In sum, while the third subfactor tends to favor treating 
MSU as an arm of the State, the other funding subfactors tip 
decisively the other way.  We therefore conclude that the 
funding factor counsels against Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. 
2. The Status Under State Law Factor 
 The second Fitchik factor requires us to ascertain the 
“status of the agency under state law,” which includes such 
considerations as “how state law treats the agency generally, 
whether the entity is separately incorporated, whether the 
agency can sue or be sued in its own right, and whether it is 
immune from state taxation.”  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659.  In 
addition to these subfactors explicitly listed in Fitchik, we 
have also considered the entity’s authority to exercise the 
power of eminent domain, application of state administrative 
procedure and civil service laws to the entity, the entity’s 
ability to enter contracts and make purchases on its own 
behalf, and whether the entity owns its own real estate.  See, 
e.g., Bowers, 475 F.3d at 548; Bolden, 953 F.2d at 820; 
Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662-63; Kovats, 822 F.2d at 1310.   
                                                                                                     
immunity—a sub silentio authorization of a raid on the state 
treasury.  Springer v. Gov’t of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 
189, 206 (1928) (explaining that courts do not draw negative 
inferences when “a contrary intention on the part of the 
lawmaker is apparent”); Reilly v. Ozzard, 166 A.2d 360, 365 
(N.J. 1960) (rejecting negative inferences when context 
indicates such inferences are improper). 
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 We have recognized that the multifaceted nature of the 
status under state law factor can make it so hopelessly 
“checkered” that it does not “significantly help in determining 
whether [the entity] is entitled to immunity from suit in 
federal court,” and thus effectively drops out of our overall 
Fitchik analysis.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662 (citing Kovats, 822 
F.2d at 1310).  That is not the case here, however.  We 
address each consideration below and conclude that, while 
MSU certainly has attributes that point both ways, on the 
whole its status under state law counsels in favor of extending 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
 Treatment Under State Law Generally.  In determining 
“how state law treats the agency generally,” id. at 659, we 
look to (1) explicit statutory indications about how an entity 
should be regarded; (2) case law from the state courts—
especially the state supreme court—regarding an entity’s 
immunity or status as an arm of the State; and (3) whether the 
entity is subject to laws for which the State itself has waived 
its own immunity (such as state tort claims acts).  E.g., 
Christy, 54 F.3d at 1148-49; Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 662-63; 
Skehan I, 538 F.2d at 62.  Those indicators point both ways 
here, leading us to conclude that MSU’s general treatment 
under state law is simply inconclusive.   
 As for explicit statutory indicators, MSU argues that 
New Jersey law squarely locates state colleges in the 
Department of State, thus indicating they exist as agencies—
and therefore “arms”—of the State.  But the statute MSU 
cites is a double-edged sword.  True, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18A:3B-27 provides that “any State institution of higher 
education . . . shall be allocated to the Department of State,” 
but the statute continues: “[n]otwithstanding this allocation, 
any such institution shall be independent of any supervision 
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or control of the Department of State or any board, 
commission or officer thereof and the allocation shall not in 
any way affect the . . . institutional autonomy” of the 
college.16  MSU’s statutory “allocation” to the State thus 
offers little guidance.17  
                                              
16 In a related argument directed at Fitchik’s third 
factor, autonomy, MSU urges that New Jersey’s abolishment 
in 2011 of the Commission on Higher Education—an entity 
that was designed to be a liaison between the colleges and the 
Governor’s office and to engage in some administrative 
oversight of the colleges, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:3B-13—and 
its transfer of those duties to the Secretary of Higher 
Education, 43 N.J. Reg. § 1625(a), reflects a deliberate 
consolidation of power in a cabinet-level official that strips 
the colleges of autonomy.  As observed by the District Court, 
however, MSU’s characterization of this change is misplaced, 
for the implementing regulation expressly states that it was 
designed not only to “improve the effectiveness of the State’s 
oversight of higher education” but also to “improv[e] the 
strength and independence of boards of trustees,” id.; thus it 
does not represent some sea change in the institutions’ 
autonomy under state law. 
 
 17 State colleges also are described with reference to 
the “State” or as “state agenc[ies]” in other statutory 
provisions.  E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:3B-6(h) (referring to 
state colleges as “State entities”), 52:14B-2 (referring to 
entities subject to the New Jersey Administrative Procedure 
Act as “state agenc[ies]”), 59:1-3 (referring to certain entities 
subject to the Tort Claims Act as part of the “State”), 59:13-2 
(same for the Contractual Liability Act).  We attach only 
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 MSU’s treatment under New Jersey case law is 
likewise inconclusive.  In Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 
655-67 (N.J.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court invoked Urbano to determine that the 
University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey would 
not qualify as an alter ego of the State for purposes of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity and hence qualified as a 
“person” subject to liability for discrimination claims brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NJLAD.  Just three years 
later, however, the same Court explained that New Jersey 
City University (then known as Jersey City State College)— a 
college very similar to MSU—is a “State agency” for some 
purposes, suggesting that it would be immune from local 
regulations and property taxes, even though it might not be 
for discrimination claims.  N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. 
Gruzen P’ship, 592 A.2d 559, 563 (N.J. 1991).18  Thus, the 
                                                                                                     
limited significance to a State’s denomination of an entity as 
an arm of the State, however, for blind deference to a 
legislature’s description would abdicate the courts’ 
responsibility to conduct individualized determinations and 
would bestow upon States the unfettered ability to immunize 
the activities of any number of entities.  See Christy, 52 F.3d 
at 1149 n.9 (citing Bolden, 953 F.2d at 815 n.8, 817). 
 
 18 We disagree with MSU that Fuchilla is not relevant 
to MSU because the college at issue in that case was then 
governed by a different set of statutes than those governing 
state colleges like MSU.  While that is true as far as it goes, 
New Jersey Educational Facilities Authority then cited to 
Fuchilla to suggest that New Jersey City University—a state 
college that is governed by the same statutes as MSU—might 
not be immune from discrimination claims.  592 A.2d at 563. 
 28 
New Jersey Supreme Court—purporting to adhere to our 
Urbano/Fitchik framework—appears to have adopted a 
claim-specific approach to immunity that turns on “the 
fundamental purposes of the relevant laws or doctrines and 
the reasons [the court] believe[s] would best accord with the 
measure of independence the Legislature would intend to give 
to the State-university system.”  Id. 
 In Fitchik, we cited Fuchilla favorably and 
characterized it as “evinc[ing] some reluctance on the part of 
the New Jersey courts to accord immunity to agencies whose 
status under New Jersey statutes is ambiguous.”  873 F.2d at 
663.  Given the New Jersey Supreme Court’s subsequent 
decision in New Jersey Educational Facilities Authority, 
however, its jurisprudence is of limited use to our analysis 
because, to the extent it assumed our Urbano/Fitchik test 
would authorize courts to parse claim-specific Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, it was mistaken.  We view that 
approach as untenable—both practically and in principle.  
Fitchik contemplated judicial determinations of Eleventh 
Amendment status for entities, not for claims, and carving 
discrimination claims out for special treatment does not 
square with that categorical model.19  Moreover, because 
                                              
 19 Of course, Congress may abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity for specific claims pursuant to its 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, and States may 
waive their immunity to suit in federal court at their 
discretion if done unequivocally.  Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); see also Pa. 
Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs v. Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 323 (3d 
Cir. 2002).   
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Fuchilla was decided before Fitchik condensed Urbano into 
three factors and before Benn rendered the funding factor co-
equal, the propriety of Fuchilla’s Eleventh Amendment 
analysis is suspect in light of those changes to our 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Endl v. New Jersey, 5 F. Supp. 3d 
689, 699-700 (D.N.J. 2014) (questioning the continued 
vitality of Fuchilla in a post-Fitchik world); Overton v. 
Shrager, C.A. No. 09-6299 (MLC), 2011 WL 2937363, at *4-
5 (D.N.J. 2011) (same).20 
                                              
 20 MSU directs us to two additional state cases that do 
specifically address MSU, but neither purports to apply 
Fitchik, and both give only mixed signals.  In Chasin v. 
Montclair State University, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
implicitly recognized that MSU professors are state 
employees for purposes of the Tort Claims Act, thus entitling 
them to representation and indemnification by the State to the 
extent allowed by the Tort Claims Act, but that case also 
recognized that state colleges and their faculty retain 
significant autonomy regarding the defense of tort claims not 
afforded to other state entities and employees.  See 732 A.2d 
457, 469 (N.J. 1999); but cf. N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth., 592 
A.2d at 563 (noting that state university employees may not 
be considered state employees in conflict-of-interest cases).  
And in Batkay v. Montclair State University, New Jersey’s 
intermediate appellate court called MSU “a state agency,” but 
it simultaneously recognized that, while MSU may be housed 
in the Department of State, it is deemed by statute to be 
autonomous.  See Dkt. No. A-3806-02T2, slip op. at 4-6 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 27, 2004) (per curiam) (citing N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:3B-27). 
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 The third indicator of treatment under state law—
whether the entity is subject to laws for which the State has 
waived its own immunity—also does little to tip the scales 
here.  On the one hand, MSU is subject to the Tort Claims 
Act, which typically counsels in favor of immunity because it 
implies that, like the State itself, MSU would be immune 
from tort claims absent the Act.  On the other hand, this Tort 
Claims Act—in contrast to the one we observed favored 
immunity for the University of Iowa in Bowers, 475 F.3d at 
548 (citing Iowa Code ch. 699, 670)—also applies to 
municipalities and counties, which do not benefit from 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, Lake Country Estates, Inc. 
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979), 
thus undercutting the inference that entities subject to this Act 
are otherwise immune from suit, Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663 
(discounting the pertinence to the immunity inquiry of New 
Jersey’s Tort Claims Act because it applies to political 
subdivisions as well).   
 Separate Incorporation.  Separate incorporation 
disassociates an entity from its State and thus weakens its 
claim to Eleventh Amendment immunity.  See Fitchik, 873 
F.2d at 663.  This consideration has little bearing on MSU, 
however, for while New Jersey law provides that state 
colleges “have the power and duty to . . . [a]dopt and use a 
corporate seal,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-6(a), there is no 
indication that MSU has ever invoked this authority to 
actually incorporate.  Cf. id. § 18A:65-2 and -11 (expressly 
preserving Rutgers’s corporate seal and independent 
corporate status from its time as a private institution). 
 Ability to Sue and Be Sued.  An entity is more likely 
to be an arm of the State and partake of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity if it lacks the ability to sue and be sued in its own 
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name.  See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663.  State colleges like MSU 
enjoy no explicit grant of such authority, and state case law 
indicates that, in the absence of an affirmative grant of such 
power, a state college cannot sue and be sued in its own right.  
Frank Briscoe Co. v. Rutgers, the State University, 327 A.2d 
687, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974).21 
 Not only does the absence of an affirmative grant of 
the power to sue and be sued indicate MSU lacks such 
authority, but provisions of the New Jersey code that govern 
MSU support that conclusion as well.  For example, the Tort 
Claims Act and the Contractual Liability Act, which do not 
apply to entities that can sue and be sued, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 59:1-3, :13-2, do apply to state colleges like MSU, see id. 
§ 18A:3B-6(h) (authorizing state colleges to use the Attorney 
General to represent them in Tort Claims Act suits); id. § 
59:13-2 (providing that entities that can sue and be sued are 
not subject to the Contractual Liability Act); Stony Brook 
Constr. Co. v. Coll. of N.J., 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 
799, at *38-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 16, 2008) 
(unpublished) (concluding that because a state college 
governed by the same statutes as MSU cannot sue and be 
sued, it is subject to the Contractual Liability Act).   
                                              
21 The New Jersey Superior Court deemed Rutgers an 
exception to this rule because it had the power to sue and be 
sued in its capacity as a private institution and, in the absence 
of contrary legislative intent, thereby retained that power 
when it became a public university, notwithstanding the 
absence of any affirmative grant of such authority by the 
legislature.  Frank Briscoe Co., 327 A.2d at 693. 
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 In addition, although state colleges like MSU were 
authorized by statute to make a binding election within a 
certain window of time to retain private counsel (instead of 
being represented by the Attorney General) to defend against 
tort claims, which might indicate an ability to sue and be sued 
generally, the same statute specifies that opting for private 
representation renders the college “a sue and be sued entity 
for the purposes of the ‘New Jersey Tort claims Act’ only.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:3B-6(h).  The statute also provides that, 
should a college opt for private representation, it must 
provide its employees with the “defense and indemnification” 
that they, as state employees, would “otherwise . . . be 
entitled to from the Attorney General pursuant to [the Tort 
Claims Act].”  Id.  These provisions make clear that, in the 
normal course, colleges like MSU are treated for litigation 
purposes like any state agency and thus may not sue and be 
sued under New Jersey law. 
 Indeed, the only indication that MSU can sue and be 
sued in its own name is that it hired a private law firm to 
bring a civil suit in 2012.  See Montclair State Univ. v. Oracle 
USA, Inc., C.A. No. 11-2867 (FLW), 2012 WL 3647427 
(D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2012).  In supplemental briefing, MSU 
argued that this suit was not evidence of any general statutory 
authorization to sue and be sued because MSU was 
specifically permitted to bring that suit under N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 18A:3B-6(h) and 18A:64-7.  But neither statute supports 
that assertion.  While § 18A:3B-6(h) authorizes state colleges 
“[t]o retain counsel of the institution’s choosing,” for the 
reasons explained above, the same provision indicates that 
state colleges are authorized to sue and be sued only in the 
limited context of Tort Claims Act claims.  Setting aside the 
myriad reasons a college may have to retain counsel other 
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than to pursue litigation, the lawsuit in Oracle proceeded on 
contractual claims—after all tortious claims had been 
dismissed—in apparent defiance of the limited, torts-only 
scope of sue and be sued authority afforded to state colleges 
by statute.  2012 WL 3647427, at *12.  And § 18A:64-7 
authorizes colleges to “exercise the powers, rights and 
privileges that are incident to the proper government, conduct 
and management of the college . . .,” but it does not reference 
litigation at all.  That this appears to be the sole instance in 
which MSU has brought suit in its own name, and given its 
lack of authority to sue and be sued outside the Tort Claims 
Act context, we suspect MSU acted outside of its authority 
when it filed suit in Oracle, and we will not abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity on the basis of an apparent 
aberration.  In sum, MSU’s inability to sue and be sued favors 
immunity.  
 Immunity from State Taxes.  It is undisputed that MSU 
and other state colleges are immune from state taxes and from 
municipal and county ordinances.  O’Connell v. State, 795 
A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 2002) (“Montclair [State University] is 
exempt from federal and state taxation.”); see also N.J. Educ. 
Facilities Auth., 592 A.2d at 563 (indicating that New Jersey 
City University, which is governed by the same statutory 
scheme as MSU, would be immune from local land-use 
regulations).  This fact clearly weighs in favor of immunity.  
See Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663. 
 Eminent Domain.  State colleges have the power of 
eminent domain.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-6(l).  Because this 
is a sovereign power, it tips slightly in favor of immunity, but, 
just as with the Tort Claims Act, we take this fact with a grain 
of salt because New Jersey’s political subdivisions also have 
this authority.  Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 663. 
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 Administrative Procedure and Civil Service Laws.  An 
entity’s claim to immunity is stronger if it is subject to a 
State’s administrative procedure and civil service laws.  
Kovats, 822 F.2d at 1310 (noting that Rutgers’s claim to 
immunity was weakened by the fact that, “unlike other state 
agencies, [Rutgers is] not subject to civil service laws . . . or 
administrative procedure requirements”).  State colleges like 
MSU are subject to the strictures of the New Jersey 
Administrative Procedure Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:14B-1 to 
-31, when carrying out certain disciplinary or employment 
proceedings, and the decisions rendered by the colleges in 
those instances are subject to judicial review.  Id. § 18A:3B-
6(f).  Moreover, for a significant subset of employees, state 
colleges are subject to New Jersey’s civil service laws, id. 
§ 18:64-6(i)—a fact that, according to MSU, is unique among 
the States.  MSU also notes that it should be viewed more like 
a state agency because its employees benefit from the state 
health care and pension programs, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:66-
170, and we agree this trait is relevant.  These attributes 
counsel in favor of immunity. 
 Power to Enter Contracts.  We also consider whether 
an entity may enter contracts on its own accord, which cuts 
against immunity, see Kovats, 822 F.2d at 1310 (noting that 
Rutgers is not subject to New Jersey’s competitive bidding 
statutes), and whether its contractual authority is subject to 
state-imposed limits, which cuts in favor, see Bowers, 475 
F.3d at 548 (noting that the University of Iowa “is unable to 
buy or transfer real estate without the express permission of” 
another state agency).  Unhelpfully, for New Jersey state 
colleges, the answer is “yes” to both questions, see N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 18A:64-6(k) (authorizing state colleges to enter 
contracts subject to the provisions of the State College 
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Contracts Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:65-52 to -93), 
rendering this consideration of little relevance. 
Ownership of Land.  Finally, we take note of whether 
a state-affiliated institution of higher learning retains title of 
the land on which it sits, with state ownership tipping in favor 
of immunity.  Bowers, 475 F.3d at 548 (noting that, per the 
state constitution, Iowa owned the University of Iowa’s land); 
Kovats, 822 F.2d at 1309 (noting that Rutgers retained title to 
the land on which it sits).  Here this consideration slightly 
disfavors arm of the State status, as MSU appears to retain 
title to at least some of its land.  New Jersey state colleges are 
authorized to purchase and own property without seeking 
state permission, implying that, in such instances, the 
property is titled under the college’s name.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 18A:64-6(k), (q).  And although state law provides that 
parcels “titled in the name of the State Board of Higher 
Education or the State Department of Higher Education, 
which are occupied by a public institution of higher 
education[,] shall be titled in the name of the State of New 
Jersey,” id. § 18A:72A-29, it also describes certain land as 
being “owned by [a] university or by [a] particular college,” 
id. § 18A:72A-26, and contemplates land conveyances 
“executed and delivered in the name of the college,” id. 
§ 18A:72A-29. 
*    *    * 
 We emerge from this analysis with subfactors on both 
sides of the scale as to MSU’s “status under state law.”  One 
of them—ownership of land—points against immunity, and 
three others—treatment under state law generally, separate 
incorporation, and power to enter contracts—are 
inconclusive.  But considering that MSU cannot sue and be 
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sued in its own name, is immune from state taxes, can 
exercise the power of eminent domain, and generally is 
subject to New Jersey administrative procedure and civil 
service laws, the balance of considerations defining MSU’s 
“status under state law” cuts in favor of immunity.  The 
second Fitchik factor thus tips in MSU’s favor. 
3. The Autonomy Factor 
 Although an entity’s treatment under state law has 
obvious repercussions for the autonomy of its operations, 
Fitchik directs that autonomy be analyzed as a distinct factor, 
focusing on the entity’s governing structure and the oversight 
and control exerted by a State’s governor and legislature.  
See, e.g., Febres, 445 F.3d at 231-32; Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 
663-64.  The lesser the autonomy of the entity and greater the 
control by the State, the greater the likelihood the entity will 
share in the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.  While 
the New Jersey code again gives some inconsistent signals, 
we conclude it imposes sufficient constraints on MSU’s 
autonomy to favor immunity. 
 Our benchmarks, at the opposite ends of the spectrum, 
are Rutgers and the University of Iowa.  In Kovats, we 
concluded Rutgers was “largely autonomous.”  822 F.2d at 
1311.  It had two governing boards: the eleven-member 
Board of Governors, of which six were appointed by the 
Governor of New Jersey, and the Board of Trustees, a 
minority of which were appointed by the Governor.  Id.  
Because of the institution’s history as a private institution, the 
trustees held significant power, further insulating 
decisionmaking from the Governor’s control.  Id.  By statute, 
both boards were “given a high degree of self-government” 
and were empowered to act “without recourse or reference to 
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any department or agency of the state, except as otherwise 
expressly provided.”  Id. (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:65-
27(I)(a), -28).  The boards were encumbered by only two 
state-imposed limitations, the effect of which we deemed 
“minimal”: the Board of Governors had to comply with the 
State’s budget appropriations and abide by state laws and 
regulations.  Id.  Moreover, Rutgers was not required to 
manage its funds as public monies, could establish accounts 
and invest or withdraw funds as desired, could make 
unregulated spending decisions within the broad contours of 
the State’s appropriations, only had to report its financial 
choices to the State (rather than obtain approval from the 
State), and did not have to comply with civil service, 
competitive bidding, or administrative procedure 
requirements.  Id. at 1311-12.  In short, the Governor and 
state legislature had little power over the inner workings of 
Rutgers aside from a small number of appointments and 
overall spending parameters for state funds. 
 Contrast the University of Iowa, where we concluded 
the entity was not autonomous.  The Board of Trustees, we 
determined, was “tightly constrained by state authority” 
because all nine members of the Board were appointed by the 
Governor for six-year terms and were removable by the 
Governor for cause (with state senate approval); the Board’s 
expenses were reimbursed by the State and reported to the 
Governor; various state statutes constrained the Board’s 
procurement capabilities, ability to accept and administer 
trusts, and the number and location of meetings allowed; the 
Board could not acquire or transfer real estate without 
permission from a council that included the Governor and 
members of his cabinet; the Board had to turn over ownership 
of all patents and copyrights to the State; the Board was 
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required to file biennial budget reports to the Governor and 
legislature; and the Board had to hire a budget analyst to 
prepare its budget.  Bowers, 475 F.3d at 548-49. 
 While MSU shares characteristics of both of these 
schools, it is, on the whole, more akin to the University of 
Iowa, and hence, we conclude, not autonomous.  The 
Governor looms large in the affairs of New Jersey state 
colleges.  All members of the Board of Trustees are appointed 
by the Governor and confirmed by the state senate for six-
year terms, from which they are removable for cause.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-3.  In addition, the Governor is 
statutorily designated as the public “employer” of all college 
employees, which vests him with the sole power to 
collectively bargain on their behalf.  Id. § 18A:64-21.1. 
 Although the Governor possesses no apparent veto 
authority over state college decisions,22 the Secretary of 
Higher Education, a member of the Governor’s cabinet, has 
authority to issue master plans for higher education in the 
                                              
 22 We did not consider the relevance of a gubernatorial 
veto in Kovats or Bowers, but we did in Fitchik, where we 
determined the entity’s board was “significantly 
autonomous,” but the Governor could subsequently veto the 
board’s actions.  873 F.2d at 663-64; see also Febres, 445 
F.3d at 230-31 (considering the effect of the Governor’s 
“constrained” veto power on autonomy).  Our conclusion in 
Fitchik that the particular combination of significant 
autonomy and gubernatorial control counseled “slightly” in 
favor of immunity, 873 F.2d at 664, has little bearing here 
where MSU’s board cannot be described as “significantly 
autonomous.” 
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State, license and accredit the institutions, impose ethics rules 
for them, approve certain new academic programs, review 
budget requests, and issue regulations relating to licensure, 
outside employment, tuition, personnel, tenure, and 
retirement programs.  Id. §§ 18A:3B-14, -15; see also 43 N.J. 
Reg. § 1625(a).  The Secretary may also, “with the 
concurrence of the Governor,” visit a school at any time to 
review its financials and compliance with all appropriate laws 
and regulations and may issue subpoenas to investigate 
suspected wrongdoing.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:3B-34.  The 
colleges also are required to spend their budgets in 
accordance with the general provisions of the state budget and 
appropriations, and may be subject to audit at any time to 
ensure such conformance.  Id. § 18A:64-6(f). 
 New Jersey law further constrains state colleges like 
MSU by subjecting them to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, the State College Contracts Law, and the civil service 
laws.23  Id. §§ 18A:3B-6(f), :64-6(h), (k), (w), (x), :64-52 to -
93.  In addition, they must comply with certain limitations on 
their ability to make deposits in financial institutions absent 
security from the institution, id. § 18A:64-18.5; restrict their 
government relations and lobbying activities according to 
statutory bounds, id. § 18A:3B-54; and have their contractual 
obligations tied to the state coffers under the Contractual 
                                              
 23 Academic faculty are excepted from the civil service 
laws, giving colleges considerable autonomy to set salaries 
for those individuals and to hire or fire them without being 
subject to review by the Vacancy Review Board.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 18A:64-21.2, -21.3. 
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Liability Act, id. § 59:13-1 to -10; Stony Brook Constr. Co., 
2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS, at *38-39 .  
 These colleges are also subject to significant reporting 
requirements and rules for internal governance.  For example, 
they must hire an independent auditor and prepare a publicly 
available audit, prepare an annual report on their general 
operations, prepare a long-range facilities plan that includes a 
description of the source of non-state funds, and present the 
Governor and legislature with an annual budget report.  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:3B-6(l), -35, -39, -48 to -51, :64-6(d).  
Moreover, each college’s board of trustees is required to hold 
a September meeting every year, and the presidents of each 
college (who are, themselves, selected by the gubernatorial-
appointed board, id. § 18A:64-6(g)) are required by law to sit 
on the Presidents’ Council.  Id. §§ 18A:3B-7, :64-4. 
 At the same time, we recognize MSU bears some 
hallmarks of an autonomous entity.  For example, the New 
Jersey legislature has on many occasions declared its 
intention for state colleges to have “institutional autonomy.”  
Id. § 18A:3B-27.24  While trustees are appointed by the 
                                              
 24 See also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-7 (characterizing 
the boards’ powers as being “exercised without recourse or 
reference to any department or agency of the State”); id. 
§ 18A:3B-2 (seeking “the elimination of unnecessary State 
oversight” and providing “greater decision making and 
accountability . . . at the institutional level”); id. § 18A:64-1 
(offering state colleges “a high degree of self-government”).  
Although we view skeptically a state legislature’s 
denomination of an entity as an arm of the State, we do so to 
prevent States from sweeping too many entities into the ambit 
of the Eleventh Amendment, see supra n.17; that concern is 
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Governor, they receive no compensation and can only be 
removed from their six-year terms for cause, according them 
considerable decisional independence once appointed.  Id. 
§ 18A:64-3, -5; accord Univ. of R.I. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 2 
F.3d 1200, 1208 (1st Cir. 1993).  But cf. Bowers, 475 F.3d at 
549 (noting that the University of Iowa was not autonomous 
in part because the Governor could remove board members 
for cause).   And the Board of Trustees does retain some 
degree of self-governance and significant authority to manage 
MSU.25  But we are not persuaded that these attributes of 
                                                                                                     
absent when a legislature indicates an entity is not an arm of 
the State by describing it as autonomous, and we thus may 
give more weight to such pronouncements.  Here, however, in 
the broader context of the colleges’ reporting obligations, 
government oversight, and statutory placement in the 
Department of State, we take these pronouncements to reflect 
the legislature’s effort to navigate between granting colleges 
the autonomy necessary for academic independence and 
competitiveness on the one hand, and providing significant 
oversight over their internal governance on the other.   
 
 25 For example, it retains power to choose its own size 
(between seven and fifteen members) and to set the number 
and dates of its meetings (aside from the required September 
meeting).  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:64-3, -4.  In addition, it is 
authorized, among other things, to set, raise, and keep tuition 
and fees, id. §§ 18A:3B-6(c), :64-6(n), (o), -13, -18, to settle 
disputes (under the Administrative Procedure Act rules), id. 
§ 18A:3B-6(f), to invest and reinvest funds (and save its 
earnings), id. §§ 18A:3B-6(g), :64-18.2, to purchase real 
estate and other property without preapproval (but subject to 
limits), id. § 18A:64-6(k), (q), to set its own educational 
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independence, when weighed against the indicia of state 
control, make MSU autonomous.  
*    *    * 
 In sum, notwithstanding that it retains some modicum 
of autonomy and that the indicia of state control are not as 
“tight[]” as in Bowers, 475 F.3d at 549, we conclude that 
MSU’s autonomy is constrained enough to tip this factor in 
favor of immunity. 
4. Balancing 
 The upshot of our review is that Fitchik’s funding 
factor weighs against immunity, but its status under state law 
and autonomy factors both favor immunity.  Thus, on 
balance, the Fitchik factors favor MSU’s claim to Eleventh 
Amendment protection.  See Bowers, 475 F.3d at 549-50.  We 
recognize that, absent recourse to the federal courts, Maliandi 
may have limited and unsatisfying avenues to obtain relief for 
the alleged discrimination she suffered.  Yet, comity and state 
sovereignty are constitutional precepts and lynchpins of our 
federalist system of government, and where, as here, the State 
creates an entity that functions on balance as an arm of the 
State, the Eleventh Amendment’s protection must carry the 
day.  Accordingly, the constitutional right of the State of New 
Jersey to be free from private suit in federal court must be 
                                                                                                     
curriculum and internal policies, id. § 18A:64-6(b), (c), to 
form, along with other state institutions, 501(c) organizations, 
id. § 18A:3B-6.1, to purchase some types of insurance, id. 
§ 18A:64-87, and to control its own grounds, buildings, and 
other property, id. § 18A:64-19. 
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respected, and, unless the District Court determines on 
remand that New Jersey has waived its immunity for 
Maliandi’s NJLAD claim, the suit against MSU must be 
dismissed.  
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand 
the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
